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THE STORM ARRIVES: THE FIRST
AMENDMENT CASES IN THE SUPREME
COURT'S 1999-2000 TERM
PROFESSOR JOEL M. GORA1
INTRODUCTION
When I was a young lawyer finishing up a judicial
clerkship, I had two wonderful job offers within the public interest
community. One was from the ACLU and the other was from the
Legal Aid Society, working for Will Hellerstein. I chose to accept
the ACLU offer, and I had a wonderful time working with the
people there on important constitutional law cases. But I always
knew that if I had taken the Legal Aid offer I would have had a
chance to learn the art of lawyering from a lawyer's lawyer. I am
glad that Will Hellerstein and I have been colleagues working
together at Brooklyn Law School for a long time. So, it all worked
out in the long run.
I took the ACLU path and spent most of my time laboring
in the First Amendmente vineyards. This past Term in the
Supreme Court has been a fateful season for the First Amendment.
When I spoke a year ago, I characterized the previous Term as "the
calm before the storm," because the Court decided only two,
relatively inconsequential, First Amendment cases. I think the
storm has finally hit this year, and in its wake we see a Court
sharply divided on the First Amendment issues of freedom of
speech, freedom of expression, and freedom of association. 3 Since
the country was so divided politically, perhaps it is not surprising
that the Court was as well. What this means is that the future of
the First Amendment is very much in the balance.
Since this is the baseball play-off season, let me tell you
that the Court's batting average on First Amendment claims was
.375; the Court accepted the First Amendment claim three out of

1 Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; B.A., Pomona College; LL.B.
Columbia University School of Law.
2 U.S. CONST. amend. [. This amendment provides in pertinent part: "Congress
shall make no law.. . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." Id.
3 The Court was also sharply divided in the two First Amendment religion cases
it decided this Term, Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 120 S. Ct.
2266 (2000) and Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530 (2000).
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eight times. That is a pretty good average if you are in the major
leagues.4 But that average is a little weak if you are looking for a
Supreme Court that strongly protects First Amendment rights. I
will pursue that sports metaphor a little further in terms of the
season's batting averages of the individual Justices. The strongest
First Amendment hitter on the Court was Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy, with an average of .750, ruling for the First Amendment
claim in six out of eight cases; Justice Clarence Thomas followed
with an average of .625; Justice Antonin Scalia, with .500; and
Justices David Souter and John Paul Stevens, with .375. Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor and
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg supported the First Amendment claim
only two out of eight times, for a pretty paltry .250 average. The
weakest First Amendment supporter was the Court's most recent
member, Justice Stephen L. Breyer, who voted in favor of First
Amendment rights in only one out of eight cases, for a low score of
.125.
Lately, there has been much talk in the political world
about the importance of the 2000 elections in terms of Supreme
Court appointments. I did a little further refinement of those
statistics and found that last Term, the two Justices admired the
most by candidate George W. Bush, namely, Justices Scalia and
Thomas, had a combined First Amendment batting average of
.562. On the other hand, Justices Breyer and Ginsburg, appointed
by President Clinton, had a combined average of .187. If First
Amendment issues are a barometer for you in the selection of
presidential candidates, and you like a libertarian approach to those
issues, you can fill in the blank about who your candidate should
be. 5
4 In the 2000 baseball season, the batting leaders in both the National League,

Todd Holton of the Colorado Rockies, and the American League, Norman
Garciaparra of the Boston Red Sox, each hit an extremely respectable .372.
5 I realize, of course, that one season does not a career make. As Professor
Eugene Volokh has pointed out, if one assesses the Court's work over a six-year
period, the averages in terms of supporting First Amendment claims are
significantly different. In his scorecard the Justices rated as follows in terms of
taking speech-supportive positions in 34 cases he surveyed: Kennedy, 74%;
Thomas, 63%; Souter, 63%; Ginsburg, 58%; Stevens, 58%; Scalia, 52%;
Rehnquist, 46%; O'Connor, 46% and Breyer, 45%. See Eugene Volokh, Where
The Justices Are Unpredictable,THE NEW YORK TIMES, October 30, 2000, A23.
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Several years ago I titled my presentation here "A
Championship Season" because the Court came down in favor of
First Amendment rights in virtually every case. The common
theme of that year was that the First Amendment requires that the
government not take sides in any debate. The First Amendment is
about government neutrality and agnosticism. The Court enforced
that by showing a great deal of skepticism toward any law where it
seemed that the government was putting its thumb on the scale of
one side of the debate or the other. That skepticism was not quite
as evident this past term. In five of the eight cases, the Court
rejected the First Amendment claim. The issue for the future is
whether the First Amendment can weather another storm. I will
now address those eight cases more specifically.
WARMING UP
The Court's season got off to a rather slow and cautious
start.
In Los Angeles Police Department v. United Reporting
Publishing Corp.,6 a statute restricting access to arrestees'
addresses was challenged by a commercial information company.7
The statute provided that state and local law enforcement agencies
were required to provide the names of arrestees, but not their
addresses. 8 Access to the addresses would be granted only on the
condition that the address was requested for "scholarly,
journalistic, political or governmental" purposes, 9 or requested by
6 120

S. Ct. 483 (1999).
Id. at 486. The Court noted that prior to July 1, 1996, when the challenged
law went into effect, one could obtain the names and addresses of arrestees
under a previous version of the California Government Code, 6254(f)(3), which
made public the names, addresses and occupations of all arrestees. State and
local law enforcement agencies were required, by statute, to provide the
information. Id. The challenged statute sharply restricted the information
available.
8 Id. The state legislature amended Section 6254(0(3) on July 1, 1996.
The
7

statute limited public access to arrestees' records, placing "two conditions on
public access to arrestees' addresses - that the person requesting an address
declare that the request is being made for one of five prescribed purposes, and
that the requestor also declare that the address will not be used directly or
indirectly to sell a product or a service." Id. at 486.
9
Id.
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a licensed private investigator for investigation purposes, but not
"to sell a product or service."' 10 The case stems from the denial of
such access to a reporting company, United Reporting
Publishing." This company was a private publishing business that
obtained the names of recently-arrested individuals and provided
them to attorneys, bail bondsmen, insurance companies, drug and
alcohol counselors, community groups, and driving schools, 2 for
the purpose of allowing them to communicate with the arrestee and
offer their services. The issue was whether restricted information
made available to groups or individuals with a noble purpose, but
not to those with a commercial purpose, is a permissible distinction
under the First Amendment. 13 By a vote of seven to two, 14 the
Court concluded that it was. The lower court had invalidated the
statute on facial grounds and held that it was violative of the right
to commercial free speech insofar as it drew a distinction with
regard to the purposes needed to obtain the information. 5 That
court had reasoned that commercial speakers, who want to use the
information in order to offer their services and solicit business,
should be as entitled to gain access to the information as those who
want to put it in a newspaper or use it for an academic study or
other worthy cause. 6 The Supreme Court, however, was not
troubled by the distinction and felt that the statute did not restrain
the free expression or communication of the information.' 7 On the

1°Id.
i1Id. at 488. United Reporting Publishing Corporation's primary contention was
that the statute was invalid on its face. The Court rejected the facial challenge to
the law which restrained access to information, not speech about or publication
of such information. Moreover it was not even clear that the challenger would
be denied access to the information.
12 Los Angeles Police Dep 't, 120 S. Ct. at 486.
13Id. at 485. The Court, led by Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that the statute did
not constitute "an abridgment of anyone's right to engage in speech, but [was]
simply a law regulating access to information in the government's hands." Id.
1!4
Id. at 485-86. Justice Rehnquist delivered-the opinion of the Court. Justices
Scalia, Thomas, Ginsburg, O'Connor, Souter and Breyer also concurred in
separate opinions. Justices Stevens and Kennedy were the two dissenters. Id.
1SUnited Reported Publishing Corp. v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 946 F. Supp.
822,
825 (S.D. Cal. 1996); aff'd 146 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1998)
6
6id.
17Los

Angeles Police Dep 't, 120 S. Ct. at 489.
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contrary, the statute merely put a restraint
on access to the
8
information in the government's possession.'
The Court (lid not permit a facial challenge to the statute,' 9
since the government was not required to release this information
in the first place. 20 Therefore, if the government chooses to release
it, subject to some restrictions, it may do so. The Court suggested
that an as-applied challenge might be mounted in the future. 2 ' In
terms of the facial validity of the statute, the Court felt facial
invalidity was not an appropriate response, because the case
involved regular
access to information in the government's
22
possession.
The two dissenters, Justices Stevens and Kennedy, took the
position that the Court was denigrating the important protection
given to commercial speech and commercial information. 23 The
dissenting Justices found that most of the uses precluded by the
statute were a denial of access to highly important information,
such as the availability of legal services, bail bond services or other
information that would facilitate the right to counsel.24 The
dissenters felt that this was not an effort to protect the privacy of
the arrestees' addresses, but one to restrain communication by
disfavored commercial speakers because the government did not
1d

19 Id. The Court stated that at any time the California legislature could decide
not to give out arrestee information at all and not violate the First Amendment.
Id.
20

id.

21 Id.

at 489. The Court found that respondent's claim "did not fit within the

case law allowing courts to entertain facial challenges." Id.
22 Los Angeles Police Dep't, 120 S. Ct. at 489. Four concurring Justices
believed that the commercial non-commercial distinction would be permissible
since it was viewpoint neutral. See id. at 491.
23 Id. at 491 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The dissenters believed that "[b]y
allowing such widespread access to the information, the State has eviscerated
any rational basis for believing that the Amendment will truly protect the

privacy of these persons." Id. at 493.
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Court found that this "interest is arguably
consistent with trying to uphold the ethics of the legal profession. Also at stake
here, however, are the important interests of allowing lawyers to engage in
protected speech and potentially giving criminal defendants better access to
needed professional assistance." Id. The dissenters also believed that the many
exceptions in the statute undercut the claim that privacy of arrestees was being
protected.
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care for the information being communicated.25 The majority
disagreed and reasoned that because this was an issue of access to
information within the government's possession, rather than one of
restraining or repressing a private party's communication of
information, the statute's facial validity would be sustained.26
It was disappointing that the Court would take such a broad
view of government's power to selectively withhold information
within its control and such a narrow view of the public's right of
access to such information. The Term was not off to an auspicious
First Amendment start.
DIGGING IN
The next two cases I want to talk about are cases dealing
with issues that have bedeviled the Court for a long time. They fall
under the rubric of "lesser speech," i.e., sexually-oriented speech
27
that is legally protected by the First Amendment, but barely so.
One case involved live nude dancing, and the other dealt with the
Playboy Channel.2 8 In one of the first so-called "erogenous
zoning" cases, in which the local government used its zoning
power to disperse certain establishments that featured X-rated
entertainment,29 such regulation was upheld by a sharply-divided
Court. 30 In one of his first opinions on the Court, Justice John Paul
25 Id.

Id at 489-90. The Court felt that resorting to a facial challenge "was not
warranted because there is 'no possibility that protected speech will be muted."'
26

Id.

The Court has long struggled with the question of what level protection to
give so-called "lesser speech" such as sexual speech or commercial speech. See.
e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S.S 50 (1976); Central Hudson
Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
28 City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 120 S. Ct. 1382 (2000); United States v. Playboy
Entertainment Group, Inc., 120 S. Ct. 1878 (2000).
29 Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). Operators
of
two adult theaters brought an action against city officials for a declaratory
judgment of unconstitutionality and injunctive relief against two Detroit zoning
ordinances, which provided that an "adult theater may not be located within
27

1000 feet of any two other 'regulated uses' or within 500 feet of a residential
area. The term 'regulated uses' includes 10 different kinds of establishments in
addition to adult theaters." Id. at 52.
30

Id. at 73.
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Stevens stated that although the speech may be technically
protected by the First Amendment, ".... few of us would march our
sons and daughters off to war" to defend it. 31 Ever since this
opinion, the Court has struggled with whether this was the correct
approach to take towards lawful sexual material. Here, we are not
dealing with material that is legally obscene; such material can be
banned. Instead, we are dealing with legally-protected material.
However, in the eyes of some Justices it is barely protected. That
is what divided the Court in this Term's two cases as well.
32
The live nude dancing case, City of Erie v. Pap's A.M.,
involved not only sexual speech, but also the analytical conundrum
of what to do with expressive conduct. The City of Erie enacted an
ordinance banning all public nudity. 33 There is no question that
banning public nudity is generally valid and does not violate any
rights. The problem arises when one particular type of public
nudity is intended to be suppressed, namely live nude dancing,
where this is done to censor whatever message of eroticism or
sexuality it embodies or communicates. This is when the Court
has to decide how to deal with the issue. How can we tease out the
First Amendment components of live nude dancing in order to
determine whether laws restricting public nudity, but targeted on
that one expressive form of it, should be sustained? The Court
visited this issue about ten years ago in a case called Barnes v.
Glen Theatres, Inc.34 There, a sharply-divided Court upheld a
comparable ban.3 ;
In this year's case, there was also no majority opinion, only
a four-person plurality. The majority of justices agreed, in a six to
three result, that requiring pasties and G-strings on female dancers
does not violate the First Amendment. 36 In terms of the rationale,
31 Id.

at 70.

32 120 S. Ct. 1382 (2000).
33 Id. at 1384. The city of Erie enacted "an ordinance making it a summary

offense to knowingly or intentionally appear in public in a 'state of nudity."' Id.
34 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
35 The State of Indiana enacted a public indecency law, which required dancers
at nude dancing establishments to "wear pasties and G-strings." Id. at 567. Two
Indiana establishments claimed that their First Amendment rights were violated
b),the state's law against total nudity in public. Id.
120 S. Ct. at 1398 (plurality opinion), 1400 (Scalia, J. and Thomas, J.,
concurring).
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however, there were some sharp divisions of opinion, which need
to be noted for the implications they have in future cases. The
plurality saw this as an O'Brien case. 37 By "O'Brien," I am
referring to the Vietnam-era case involving a federal statute that
prohibited the burning of draft cards. 38 The whole world knew that
the statute was not passed to make sure that all registrants had their
draft certificates with them at all times. The underlying reason for
the law was that there was a lot of public burning of draft cards in
acts of protest against the Vietnam War, and some members of
Congress were outraged by that. So, Congress made it a crime to
destroy, burn or mutilate any selective service registration
certificates. 39 Although everyone knew that the law was designed
against burning draft cards, on its face it was not; it was neutral.
How should the Court deal with this under the First Amendment?
In the O'Brien case, the Court asked itself what should be
done when a claim arises out of conduct, which would otherwise
be punishable, but which is engaged in for expressive purposes.
Further, how does one determine whether the First Amendment
component of that expressive conduct renders the conduct itself
exempt from punishment? 40 The Court's answer was to determine
whether the reason for the ban was to suppress the message that the
conduct was communicating. 4 ' In other words, the issue was
whether or not the purpose of the ban was related to suppressing
free expression.42 In the O'Brien case, the Court concluded that
the ban was unrelated to suppressing free expression.
37

United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).

3

Id. at 369-70.

O'Brien was tried upon the charge that he "willfully and

knowingly did mutilate, destroy, and change by burning ... (his) Registration
Certificate (Selective Service System Form No. 2); in violation of Title 50,
App., United States Code, Section 462 (b) ... at the time O'Brien burned his
certificate an offense was committed by any person, 'who forges, alters,
knowingly destroys, knowingly mutilates, or in any manner changes any such
certificate .... ." Id. at 370.
39
Id. at 370.
40 O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
The Court found that "when 'speech' and
'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently
important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify

incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms." Id.
4'
42

Id. at 377.
Id. The Court stated:
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The plurality in Pap's A.M. came to the same conclusion,
that the ban on nudity viewed under the O'Brien test was
essentially a content-neutral ban.4 3 Even assuming that live nude
dancing conveyed a message, there was no evidence that the
purpose of the ban was to suppress that message. 44 The purpose
was to prevent public nudity, and that was just another application
of a valid content-neutral law. 45 These issues were seen as
governed by the O'Brien test. 46 They saw the law as a contentneutral regulation of nudity in public. The Court reasoned there
was no requirement that the local community show any specific
evidence of the "secondary effects" problem with live nude
dancing in order to sustain this law.4 7 The plurality concluded that
since the law was based on a concern about the impact of nude
dancing on the neighborhood, not on the audience, it passed the
O'Brien test. One thing that is significant in terms of the
precedential effect of the case is a fifth vote by Justice David
Souter, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 48 He concurred to
the extent that he agreed that the O'Brien test should be applied to
the issue of live nude dancing. 49 Thus, five Justices have now
taken the position that the O'Brien test applies to this type of
regulation, which is a significant change in the law from nine years
ago. But, he dissented because, in his view, under the O'Brien
test, the government must prove in a factually detailed way that
there really was a secondary effects problem associated with live
50
nude dancing which would justify a ban on live nude dancing.
Therefore, Justice Souter called for more of an evidentiary
showing. 5' There were concurring opinions by Justices Scalia and

"governmental regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional
power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment

freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." Id.
120 S. Ct. at 1388.
"Pap "sA.M., 120 S. Ct. at 1392.
41

41

Id. at 1394.

46Id.
at 1395.
47
Id. at 1394.
48 Id. at 1402-06 (Souter, J., concurring and dissenting).
49Id. at 1402.
50 Pap's A.M.,

120 S. Ct. at 1402-03.
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Thomas, stating that this is not expression at all, but merely the
conduct of nudity in public which can properly be banned.52
Accordingly, in their view, there is no need for further justification
of the regulation beyond that since this was basically not a First
Amendment case at all.53
The two dissenters who would have struck down the
statute, in addition to Justice Souter, felt that the majority had
misused the secondary-effects concept. 54
The plurality, in
sustaining the statute, stated that town officials had some concern
over the so-called secondary-effects
of nude dancing
55
establishments.
The town had expressed concerns that where
these businesses were located, things like prostitution, drug use,
and pandering tended to be a problem and that banning live
nude
56
dancing would prevent those non-speech secondary effects.
The secondary-effects concept, which came out of those
early erogenous zoning cases, said that it is permissible to zone
such X-rated establishments and separate them in the community.57
The reasoning was that if these businesses were all together in one
downtown area, it would draw negative secondary-effects. 58 But,
51 Id. at 1402.

Justice Souter said "Erie's stated interest in combating the
secondary effects associated with nude dancing establishments is an
interest... properly considered under the O'Brien standards.
I do not
believe ... that the city has made a sufficient evidentiary showing to sustain its
regulation
.... " Id.
52
Id. at 1401 (Scalia, J., concurring).
" Id. Justice Scalia, in comparing this case with Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501
U.S. 560, stated "I voted to uphold the challenged... statute ... 'because, as a
general law regulating conduct and not ... directed at expression, it is not
subject to First Amendment scrutiny at all.' Erie's ordinance, too, by its terms
prohibits not merely nude dancing, but the act... of going nude in public." Id.
at 1401.
54 Id. at 1407. Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg were the two dissenters.
The dissenters believed that the secondary effects concept applied only to the
regulation of the location of these businesses not to the content of the nude
dancing. Id.
"
56 Id. at 1395.
Pap'sA.M, 120 S. Ct. at 1395.
57 City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 54-55 (1986). See
also City of Erie, 120 S. Ct. 1395 (2000) (citing Young v. American Mini
Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976)).
58City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 50-52. See also City of Erie, 120 S. Ct. at 1395
(citing Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976)).
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the dissenters pointed out that this ordinance was not a "zoning" of
the location of this type of speech, but rather a total ban on that
speech.59 As a doctrinal matter, the dissenters felt it was
inappropriate for the plurality to use the secondary-effects concept
to again justify a prohibition of speech deemed disagreeable and
not a relocation of certain types of barely protected speech.6 ° They
concluded that the law on live nude dancing was not unrelated to
suppressing the message of sexuality it conveyed.
Despite these dissenting views, at least for the time being
the issue seems to be resolved. Communities can continue to ban
these live nude-dancing establishments, without a significant
showing of the factual concerns that motivated that ban. 6 1 In City
of Erie, four Justices gave a light reading to the O 'Brien test. 62 In
combining those views with the position of Justices Scalia and
Thomas, who felt there was no First Amendment problem at all,
there is essentially a six-person majority for upholding those
laws.63

The Court's other sexual content case was decided in a
different manner.
United States v. Playboy Entertainment
65
64
Group, dealt with sexual speech and involved cable television.
In this case, the First Amendment claimant, Playboy Entertainment
Group, prevailed.65 With an opinion written by Justice Anthony
Kennedy, Justice Clarence
Thomas was the "swing vote" in favor
67
Playboy.
of protecting
City of Erie, 120 S. Ct. at 1406 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "Until now, the
'secondary effects' of commercial enterprises featuring indecent entertainment
have justified only the regulation of their location. For thefirst time, the Court
has now held that such effects may justify the total suppression of protected
seech." Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
'9

61 id.

62

Id at 1389. The Court reasoned that if the governmental purpose for enacting

the regulation was unrelated to the suppression of expression, as it was here,
then the regulation need only satisfy the "less stringent"standard from O 'Brien
for evaluating restrictions on symbolic speech. Id. (emphasis added).
63 The four Justices referred to are Justice O'Connor, Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justice Kennedy and Justice Breyer. Id. at 1387.
64 120 S. Ct. 1878 (2000).
65 Id. at 1882.
66Id. at 1893.
67
Id. at 1894.

214

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 17

The case dealt with the cable television problem of "signal
bleed." Signal bleed occurs when a viewer can see or hear a little
bit of programming on a sexually-oriented channel, although
"scrambled," even though the viewer does not subscribe to the
68
channels and does not want access to that content.
As part of the major Telecommunications Act of 1996,69
there was a provision that if sexually oriented material is being
communicated, two things must be done. 70 The program must be
fully blocked so that there is no visual or audible signal bleed. 7 1 If
that cannot be done because the technology of the local cable
operator does not allow the total blocking, then those programs can
only be run
between ten o'clock at night and six o'clock in the
72
morning.
The Playboy Channel challenged the Act because Playboy
likes to be "all sex all the time., 73 They argued that the ban was
content-based, since it applied to channels "primarily dedicated to
sexually oriented programming," and that there should not be a ban
on the hours of broadcasting such sexually explicit programs; their
challenge succeeded.74 Justice Kennedy's glowing tribute to free
speech observed that "the history of the law of free expression is
68

Id. at 1883. The Court describes signal bleed as a phenomenon occurring as

the result of the impreciseness of signal scrambling, where -discernible pictures
may appear from time to time on the scrambled screen or the listener may hear
the audio portion of the program. Id.
69 47 U.S.C. § 561 (1994 ed., Supp. 111).
70 Id. Section 505 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 provides that, "in
providing sexually explicit adult programming or other programming that is
indecent on any channel of its service primarily dedicated to sexually oriented
programming, a multichannel video programming distributor shall fully

scramble or otherwise fully block the video and audio portion of such channel so
that one not a subscriber to such channel or programming does not receive it."
Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Playboy

Entertainment Group, 120 S. Ct. at 1883.

The Court noted that
Playboy's revenues were reduced by the restriction of programming to the hours
between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. Id. at 1884.
74 Id. at 1884. The Court stated that "'since 30 to 50% of all adult programming
is viewed by households prior to 10:00 p.m.', the result was a significant
restriction of communication .... " Ultimately, the Court agreed with the

District Court's conclusion that § 505 was unconstitutional and affirmed the
District Court's decision. Id. at 1885.
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one of vindication in cases involving free speech that many
citizens may find offensive or even ugly." 75 The Court stated that
First Amendment and content-protected rights were clearly at
issue, since it was clear that the purpose of this law restricting the
information was content-based, in that the only kind of programs
that were subjectl to this regulation were those which involved
sexually-oriented materials.
In effect, this Court said, neither
HBO nor the Disney Channel had to block and scramble, but the
Playboy channel (lid because the Act was content-based.77
Content-based laws have to meet the strict scrutiny
standard.78 They have to be. shown to advance a compelling
governmental interest in the least restrictive way. 79 The Court
conceded that protecting children from unwitting exposure to
Playboy material was a compelling interest, but that Section 505 of
80
the Act was not the least restrictive means of doing so.
Technology came to Playboy's rescue. Under another provision of
the law, cable operators had to provide, upon a subscriber's
request, the technological capacity for subscribers to shut off
certain channels and not receive them at all. 8' Since there was an
alternative to a flat ban or a rerouting of this programming -- an
option which allowed viewers to make a choice -- the Court
reasoned that First Amendment issues were handled better through
the less restrictive alternative.8 2
That way, people, not
government, get to decide. Finally, the case is doctrinally
important because it reaffirms that content-based laws which only
"Id. at 1893.
76 id.

"Id. at 1885.
71 hi. at 1886.
79

Playboy Entertainment Group, 120 S. Ct. at 1886 (citing Sable

Communications of California, Inc. v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115 (1998)).
80

d. at 1888.

8' 47 U.S.C. §560 (1994 ed., Supp. III). Section 504(a) states in pertinent part:
"Upon request by a cable service subscriber, a cable operator shall, without
charge, fully scramble or otherwise fully block the audio and video

programming ... so that one not a subscriber does not receive it." Id.
2 Playboy Entertainment Group, 120 S. Ct. at 1886-87. The Court reasoned
that the alternative to §505 is found in § 504, where "the whole point of a
publicized §504 would be to advise parents that indecent material may be shown
and to afford them an opportunity to block it at all times, even when they are not

home and even after 10:00 p.m." Id. at 1893.
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burden, but do not ban certain speech, are subject to the same strict
scrutiny as total bans.
It is interesting that, once again, Justice Scalia dissents, 83 as
he did in the nude dancing case. But he did so by resurrecting an
old concept not seen in the Court since 1966, in a case called
Ginzberg v. United States.84 This case involved the concept of
commercial trafficking or pandering of sexual material.85 In
Ginzberg, the liberal Earl Warren Court nonetheless upheld the
conviction of a person who put out sexual material which itself
was quite bland, but the marketing was rather provocative.86 The
Ginzberg Court reasoned that the marketing could be used as
evidence of the intent to distribute prohibited material.87 Only
Justice Scalia subscribed to this reasoning.
Surprisingly, one of the Court's more liberal members,
Justice Stephen Breyer wrote the principal dissenting opinion. He
noted that there was insufficient evidence that many families had
contacted the cable company and asked not to have the material
presented to them. 88 Accordingly, the less-drastic alternative was
not in fact actually being used to protect children from the absence
89
of direct parental supervision when watching cable television.
Since the speech in question as well as the speaker were not
deserving of full First Amendment protection, the law should
stand. But ultimately, the majority held five to four that Playboy is
90
entitled to be free of the blocking or segregated time requirement.
These two cases show that the Court remains sharply
divided over the proper protection for sexual or erotic speech.
Justices Kennedy and Thomas switched sides in the Playboy case
to turn the six to three anti-First Amendment coalition in the nude
83

Id. at 1895 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia states in his dissent, "[w]e

have recognized that commercial entities which engage in the 'sordid business
of pandering' by 'deliberately emphasizing the sexually provocative aspects of
their nonobscene products . . .', engage in constitutionally unprotected
behavior." Id. at 1896 (citing Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966)).
84 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
85
Id. at 466.
86 Id. at 475-76.
87 Id. at 472.

Playboy EntertainmentGroup, 120 S. Ct. at 1898 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
at 1901.
90Id. at 1883.
88

89 Id.
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dancing case into a five to four free speech majority in the cable
case. The difference may be that the cable law was more
obviously a case of speech content censorship than was the
dancing case.
FREE SPEECH STRIKES OUT
Shifting from pornography to politics, the next two cases,
though dealing with widely disparate issues, are of a piece. They
both deal with very controversial public political issues that
resulted in six to three decisions upholding the laws and rejecting
the First Amendment claims. They also have the identical
Supreme Court lineups. In both cases, the majority of the Court
consisted of Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, Stevens, O'Connor,
and Rehnquist. Justices Kennedy, Scalia and Thomas were the
dissenters. In both cases, the division is sharp. The conservative
libertarians found that the statute failed the First Amendment, but
the majority of the Court, four liberals and two more conservative
justices, sustained the statute. 92 It is ironic that the liberal Justices
found no warrant for restraining the sexual speech at issue in the
Playboy and nude dancing cases, but found sufficient justification
for rejecting the free speech claims in the two cases about to be
discussed. I agree with the dissenters who contended that the
rulings slight First Amendment values and will come back to haunt
the Court.
The two cases are Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government
93
PAC, a campaign finance case, and Hill v. Colorado,94 an antiabortion demonstration case. In Nixon, disclosure is one of the
remedies frequently discussed in terms of campaign finance. 95 In
the interest of fall disclosure, therefore, I should reveal that not
only did I author the ACLU Friend of the Court brief in the Nixon
case, but I was one of the lawyers who argued against campaign
funding limits in the original landmark campaign finance case of
91 Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 120 S. Ct. 897 (2000); Hill v.
Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480 (2000).
92 id.

9' 120 S. Ct. 897 (2000).
94 120 S. Ct. 2480 (2000).
95 Nixon, 120 S. Ct. at 909 & n.7.
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Buckley v. Valeo. 9 6 The Nixon case gave the Court the opportunity
to reconsider some of what it had done in Buckley, but the Court
basically decided to leave things alone in Nixon. That was a real
disappointment.
The Buckley decision held that Congress could not limit
97
political expenditures, but could limit political contributions.
Expenditures could not be limited because they cut too close to the
bone of freedom of expression and communication. 98 But,
contributions could be limited because they were closer to
concerns about corruption or the appearance of undue influence on
elected officeholders by those individuals who made the
contributions.99
As a result of the dichotomy set up in Buckley, the last 25
years have witnessed efforts to get around this distinction. The
result has been a greater reliance on "soft money" and "issue
advocacy."' 00 These are communications that do not explicitly
advocate the election or defeat of candidates, and since they do not
emanate from candidates or their campaigns, soft money and issue
advocacy escape the bans and limits on contributions to candidates
and to campaigns that were sustained in the Buckley case.101 That
has been the major consequence of limiting contributions, but not
expenditures. In Nixon the Court had a chance to ease those
problems by eliminating low contribution limits, but it declined to
are not, and
do so. Contributions are limitable, and expenditures
10 2
today.
have
we
that
situation
the
produced
has
that
The Nixon case involved state level contribution limits,
In Missouri,
while Buckley dealt with federal limits. 10 3
contributions were limited to $1,000 for statewide elections and
$500 or $250 for local elections.' 0 4 Those limitations were
96 424 U.S 1 (1976).
97

Id. at 22.

98

Id. at 19.
Id. at 26-27. Nixon, 120 S. Ct. at 908.
100Joel Gora, Buckley v. Valeo: A Landmark of PoliticalFreedom, 33 AKRON
L. REv. 7, 28-34 (1999).
'0 Id. at 28-30.
102 Id. at 23-26.
103See Nixon, 120 S. Ct. 897; Buckley, 424 U.S. 1.
'04 Nixon, 120 S. Ct. at 901. The Missouri Legislature enacted Senate Bill 650.
99

As amended in 1997, the provision states that "to elect an individual to the
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challenged by a Republican candidate for statewide office, who did
not have a lot of money, but who had a lot of good ideas. He
wanted to rely on a small group of wealthy supporters to help him
with his campaign, but the law prevented this. 10 5 He challenged
the law as violative of the First Amendment, and the Eighth Circuit
struck the law down. 10 6 The Court of Appeals' theory was that
before government could restrict contributions, even though
Buckley said it could, Missouri had to show a pattern of corruption
from contributions or political funds as a predicate for such
legislation. 10 7 This required a demonstration of proof of a
problem that required restricting First Amendment rights in order
to solve.' 0 8 The Eighth Circuit said there had been no such proof.
Missouri had not shown it was dealing with a situation like
Watergate that had led to the original federal campaign finance
laws a generation earlier. 10 9 In addition, one judge said $1,000 is
not what it used to be. 110 The $1,000 limit as upheld in Buckley is
currently worth about $325."' One cannot buy a whole lot of
influence by making a contribution of $325, nor, conversely, can
one buy a lot of speech with that contribution if he is the speaker or
the candidate. Therefore, the lower court struck down the limit on
the grounds that even within the Buckley framework of the power

office of governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of state, state treasurer, state
auditor or attorney general, the amount of contributions made by or accepted
from any person other than the candidate in any one election shall not exceed
one thousand dollars." Mo. REv. STAT. § 130.032.1 (1998 Cum. Supp.). The
law adjusted the levels to keep up with inflation, so that by the time of suit the
limits were $1,075, $525 and $275 for the different level offices. Nixon, 120 S.

Ct. at 901-02.
05
Id. at 902.
106
Id.
107Id.

108Id.

'09 Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC v. Adams, 161 F.3d 519, 522 (8th Cir. 1998),
rev'd, sub nom Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC, 120 S.Ct. 897 (2000).
"oNixon, 120 S. Ct at 903 & n.2. Chief Judge Bowman also would have found
the law invalid. He said that "after inflation, limits of $1,075, $525, and $275
cannot compare with the $1,000 limit approved in Buckley twenty-two years
ago." Id.
..Shrink Missouri Gov't, 161 F.3d at 523, n.4.
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there had been no showing of corruption to
to limit contributions,
112
limit.
the
justify
The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit in the
11 3
in a six to three decision written by Justice Souter.
case
Nixon
The Court reaffirmed the Buckley dividing-line framework that
contributions can be limited, though expenditures cannot. 1 4 The
Court applied a watered-down intermediate level scrutiny.1 5 They
used "close scrutiny" to see if the statute is "closely drawn" to
serve a "sufficiently important [governmental] interest."' "16 Strict
scrutiny was not used. Buckley had given lesser scrutiny to
contribution limits than to expenditure limits. This decision
followed Buckley although some say the scrutiny here is more
deferential to the government's justifications than was even true in
the Buckley case.
Another thing the Court did, which some say has expanded
the government's power to control contributions, was to say that
the government had a valid interest in protecting against
corruption, the appearance of corruption, and the concern about the8
effect of cynicism about corruption on the democratic process.1
Moreover, the Court said
These are ephemeral concepts.
governments do not have to meet a heavy burden of proof on those
matters, which will make it even easier for the government to make
its case. 119

It is ironic that two months later, Justice Souter said in City
12
that government must meet a strong
of Erie v. Pap's A.M.,
burden of proof to justify a ban on live nude dancing. But when it
came to political speech, he felt you had to defer to the
12 Nixon, 120 S. Ct. at 902-03. In this theory, the Appeals Court was relying on

certain recent Supreme Court decisions that had put government to the proof
where the need for restrictions of speech is concerned, especially where the
regulations were an inconsistent hodge-podge. See Greater New Orleans
Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999).
Broadcasting
3
1 Id. at 903.
114 Id. at 901.

1156 Id. at 903-04.
11Id. at 904.
117 Nixon, 120 S.Ct. at 904.
8 Id. at 905.
".

119 See id. at 907.
120 529

U.S. 277 (2000).
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government assessment of harm. 12 1
I think there is an
inconsistency there. The Court, in an almost indifferent approach
to the issues, upheld contribution limits, as they had in Buckley,
and refused to address any of the larger issues that politicians are
addressing now, including soft money and issue advocacy and the
like that had been brought to the Court's attention. 122 Some people
argue that everything has to be limited because campaign funding
has gotten out of hand. Other people argue that since nothing else
is limited except contributions given directly to candidates, it
makes no sense to have that limitation, when so much else is
unlimited.
An even more restrictive position received concurring
support from Justices Stevens, Breyer and Ginsburg.1 23 They
indicated that on issues of soft money spending by political parties
they would be receptive to allowing restrictions on those activities
as well, and might be receptive to reconsidering the Buckley case
and upholding even more limits if the need arose. 1 24 The
dissenters took the opposite position. 125 Justice Kennedy pointed
out that the Buckley regime of, "contributions bad, expenditures
good," has led to what he calls "covert speech," namely, limits on
contributions, yet tolerance of all of the other political funding,
such as soft money or issue advocacy, that is not regulated. Such
duality and duplicity does not serve either the integrity of the First
Amendment or the integrity of our processes.' 26 His position at the
current point is that he would overrule Buckley and strike all
restrictions on funding,127relying instead on disclosure as the primary
antidote
to corruption.
Kennedy
saw limits
as a stronghonesty.
violation
1 28
of the First
Amendment and
a hindrance
to democratic

121
122
23

1
12 4

See, Nixon, 120 S. Ct. 879.
See Nixon, 120 S. Ct. at 909.
Id. at 910-13.
Id. at 914.

125 id,
26

1

Id.

127

Id. at 916. Although he left open the possibility that if Buckley were struck

down in the sense of not allowing any limits at all, and Congress were free to
operate from a blank slate and start all over again, he might look at the issues
differently depending on what Congress enacted.
128 Nixon, 120 S. Ct. at 916.
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Unfortunately, the Court lost the opportunity to shed some clear
First Amendment light on the campaign finance dilemma.
In terms of the future, we will have a short term test and
long term test of where the Court will go. The short term test will
likely come up in a case out of the Tenth Circuit involving political
party coordinated expenditures. 129 The situation involves money
spent by parties for their candidates where the parties work with
and communicate with the candidates about what message to get
out. 130 The money comes in regulated form. It is not soft money,
but so-called "hard money.' 13 1 It can be raised from people in
limited amounts. The law up to now has prohibited parties from
coordinating with their candidates in any way. The Tenth Circuit
in FederalElection Commission v. Colorado Republican Federal
Campaign Committee, 132 said that this limitation is a violation of
the Buckley principles, notwithstanding the Shrink case. 133 It is
likely that this case will be decided in the Spring of next year and
that will tell us whether the Shrink case is a harbinger of more
restrictions on campaign funding, or whether the Court will
continue to draw the sharp distinctions between contributions
coming in and expenditures going out, especially where political
party activity is concerned.
The long term issue has to do with pending legislation, as
in the McCain-Feingold bill, 134 which would essentially ban soft
money. In the 2000 Presidential election, Vice President Gore
promised that, if elected, this bill would be the first bill he would
send up to Congress. 135 If Mr. Gore had won a couple of Supreme
Court appointments to back that up, then there might have been a
good chance that the bill would pass and be sustained. Since
129 Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign
Committee, 213 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 296
(2000).
130
id.

131Id. at 1230. In other words, it is regulated money that cannot come from

certain
sources like corporations or unions and is limited in amount. Id.
32
1 Id. 213 F.3d 1221.
Id. at 1227.
i34
S. 27 (107" Congress, 1st Session).

133

135
Bill Press, Gore and Lieberman set new campaign agenda (visited on
October 31, 2000)
http://www.cnn.com/2000/ALLPOLITICS/stories/08/18/press.column/.

2000

FREEDOM OF SPEECH

Governor Bush was elected, it is somewhat less likely that there
will be campaign finance legislation. And even if the McCainFeingold bill were enacted, if Mr. Bush's Supreme Court
appointments were more like Justices Scalia and Thomas, they
would strike the bill out as violating the First Amendment.
The other free speech case dealing with a very
1 36
controversial and divisive political issue was Hill v. Colorado.
The issue is abortion, but abortion itself was not the issue in the
case. Rather the case involved protests and demonstrations at
abortion clinics. On two previous occasions, the Court dealt with
injunctive orders that attempted to protect women and abortion
clinic personnel from being harassed and physically obstructed as
they exited and entered abortion clinics or medical facilities. 137 In
these cases, the Court struck down injunctions that were too broad
and that banned any protest within hundreds of feet of an abortion
clinic, and other similar sweeping restrictions. But the Court
upheld a ban on First Amendment activity within a small distance
of the entrance to an abortion facility. The difficult issue was the
so-called "floating bubbles"or moving buffer zones that an
abortion protestor could not enter in order to approach a person.
The bubble was floating in that it moved with the person out into
the parking lot and prevented any uninvited approach. The Court
in the context of injunctions said that a "floating bubble" of fifteen
feet from which one had to stay away was too much, and burdened
38
more speech than was necessary to protect important interests.'
Colorado passed a statute saying a person could not
approach within eight feet of anyone exiting or entering a medical
facility and within one hundred feet of that facility. 1 It was a
136

120 S.Ct 2480 (2000).

137

Schenck v. Pro Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357 (1997); Madsen v. Women's

Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
...
Schenck, 519 U.S. at 377.
139 COL. REV. STAT. § 18-9-122 (1993) reads in
pertinent part:

No person shall knowingly approach another person within
eight feet of such person, unless such other person consents,
for the purpose of passing a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a
sign to, or engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling
with such other person in the public way or sidewalk area
within a radius of one hundred feet from any entrance door to

a health care facility.
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"floating bubble" for one hundred feet. 140 In order to avoid the
charge that the statute was content motivated, it applied to all
medical facilities and all advocacy activity directed toward any
person within one hundred feet of those facilities.'14 One could not
approach anybody with any issue. Although the language of the
statute is couched in advocacy terms, it clearly could have applied
if there was a union dispute at a hospital or if someone wanted to
protest the policies of an HMO. Union members would not be able
to go up to people entering and leaving the hospital to hand them a
leaflet. Also, the ban applied to any building with even one
medical office inside, including, for example, a twenty-story office
building which housed just one dentist. On its face the ban was
neutral and extremely overbroad, but in its application it was
particular because it was arguably passed for the purpose of
protecting abortion142clinics specifically, and that was what the issue
was about in Hill.
Was this a content-neutral regulation of the place and
manner of communication or was it content-based? Was it only
designed to keep anti-abortion protesters and so-called sidewalk
counselors from hassling women and clinic officials as they came
and went? The Supreme Court said it was content-neutral. 14 3 It
was designed to protect access and privacy in general, and was
unrelated to the suppression of ideas. 144 It was not there to protect

Id. at § 18-9-122(3).
140 id.

§ 18-9-122(4) (1993) reads in pertinent part: "For the
purposes of this section, 'health care facility' means any entity that is licensed,
certified, or otherwise authorized or permitted by law to administer medical
treatment in this state." Id.
142 Hill, 120 S. Ct. at 2484-85. The Court stated the issue as "[w]hether the
First
Amendment rights of the speaker are abridged by the protection the statute
provides for the unwilling listener." Id. at 2485.
' Id. at 2491. The Court said the "'principal inquiry in determining content
neutrality, in speech cases generally and in time, place, or manner cases in
particular, is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech
because of disagreement with the message it conveys."' Id. (quoting Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
144Id. The Court said that Colorado's "interest in protecting access and privacy,
and providing the police with clear guidelines, [was] unrelated to the content of
the demonstrators' speech" and "governmental regulation of expressive activity
141

COL. REV. STAT.
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against ideas the government did not like; rather, it was designed to
protect people from being hassled over any idea near a medical
faciltiy.145 The statute was also one-sided in terms of the message
with which one could approach people. For example, going up to
someone at an abortion clinic and asking, "do you have the time?,"
would not be covered by the statute. One is permitted to do that.
But asking, "do you have the time to consider what you are about
to do?," was deemed prohibited, unless the individual consented to
that person's coming within the eight-foot zone. 146 But the same
six Justice majority as in the campaign finance case upheld the
statute as content-neutral, and a reasonable regulation of the time,
place and manner of speech. They were not impressed by the
arguments that this was motivated to get at certain kinds of speech,
and they sustained 47
the statute on the basis of traditional time, place
1
rules.
and manner
The dissenters were Justices Scalia, Thomas and Kennedy,
the same three Justices that dissented in the campaign finance case.
Justice Scalia's opinion was unyielding. This case was decided on
14
the same day as Stenberg v. Carhart,'
the case that struck the ban
149
on so-called "partial birth abortions" in a five to four decision.
The Hill case was a six to three decision. 150 Justice Scalia accused
the majority of operating an "ad hoc nullification machine" that
struck down any law that interfered with abortion or those who
would advocate against abortion and that distorted First
is 'content neutral' if it is justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech." Id.
141Id. at 2488.
146Id.at 2489-90.
147 Id. at 2491.
141120 S. Ct. 2597 (2000).
149Id. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices
Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg joined. Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Scalia filed separate dissenting opinions. Justice Kennedy filed a
dissenting opinion, which was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist. Justice
Thomas filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia joined. Id.
150 Hill, 120 S. Ct. 2480. Justice Stevens wrote the decision for the Court and
was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg,
and Breyer. Justice Scalia delivered a dissenting opinion in which Justice
Thomas joined. Justice Kennedy dissented as well in an opinion drafted by
himself and not joined by any other Justice. Id.
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Amendment and constitutional doctrine in the process. He felt the
law was designed to protect abortion clinics against protesters only
because the government did not like their message.' 51 In the view
of the dissenters, this confounded decades of First Amendment
doctrine that denied government the right to protect people from
unwelcome or even offensive messages in a public place.
Justice Kennedy also wrote an impassioned dissent in the
Hill case. The primary point of his dissent was that the majority
opinion rolled back fifty years of First Amendment doctrine.
That doctrine provided for robust, unrestrained speech in public
places no matter how offensive, hurtful or obnoxious.1 4 Such
speech was protected so long as it did not devolve into violence or
incitement of violence.' 55 Justice Kennedy said the majority's
allowing states to suppress anti-abortion protest like this breaks the
implied covenant of Planned Parenthoodv. Casey.'56 The Casey
case was the decision in 1992 that, with some modifications,
reaffirmed Roe v. Wade.' 57 That result was made possible by the
concurrence of Justices Souter, O'Connor and Kennedy. 158 Justice
Kennedy believed that the trade-off was that even though we
would not allow abortion to be banned as a constitutional matter,
the Court would allow the political and persuasive processes to
fully continue to operate.' 59 The compromise also allowed free
discussion to operate in order to allow the society to decide what
their views are on abortion. This law that restricts anti-abortion
speech is a breach of that promise.' 60 It is not only saying the
government cannot reach a different conclusion about abortion, but
it is stifling people that would urge the government to reach that
151
152

Id.
See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). Justice Scalia observed

that without such protection, the First Amendment would be rendered a "dead
letter." Hill, 120 S. Ct. at 2507.
153Id. at 2516 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
114
Id. at 2522.
Id.
155
156 505

U.S. 833 (1992).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
118 Casey, 505 U.S. 833. Justices Souter, O'Connor, and Kennedy joined to
write the critical plurality opinion.
57

"9 Hill,

160id.

120 S. Ct at 2529.
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opposite conclusion. And it is depriving the protestors of a unique
medium for communicating their message at a critical moment:
"The Court tears away from the protestors161the guarantees of the
First Amendment when they most need it."
IT'S MY BAT AND BALL
The last three cases of the Term are Board of Regents v.
Southworth, 62 the student activity fee case, CaliforniaDemocratic
Party v. Jones,'63 the blanket primary election case; and Boy
Scouts of America v. Dale,164 the Boy Scouts case. They all
involve cases where government wants to use private individuals
or organizations to either subsidize a message the government
wants communicated or to require those groups to include people
that the government wants to be included.
The government prevailed in Board of Regents with the
Court's upholding the compulsory student activities fee.' 65 But the
government lost in the Jones case, with the Court's striking down a
requirement that political parties must allow any registered voter to
help select their nominee. 166 The Court also struck down the
government's requirement in Boy Scouts of America that the Boy
Scouts could not exclude an assistant scoutmaster because he was
openly gay.167 Inboth of these latter cases, the Court rejected the
government's effort to control the message that the organization
wanted to send.
In Board of Regents, the claim was that the mandatory
activities fees at large public universities, which were extracted
from the students, were being used to fund left-wing student
organizations. 168 This had been a long-standing conservative
161

Id. at 2530. It is ironic that the conservative dissenters here in championing

this form of speech sound like liberal Justices in an earlier era. See Clark v.
Community for Creative Non Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (upholding a ban
on sleeping in the park to protest homelessness).
162 120 S. Ct. 1346 (2000).
163 120 S. Ct. 2402 (2000).
'64

120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000).

165 Board of Regents, 120 S. Ct. at 1357.
166Jones, 120 S. Ct. at :2414.
167 Boy Scouts ofAmerica, 120 S. Ct. at 2458.
168 Board of Regents,

120 S. Ct. at 1350-52.
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cause celebre, to try to oppose such funding. The effort
culminated unsuccessfully in the Board of Regents case. 169 The
litigation campaign had been fueled by several Supreme Court
cases that seemed to pave the way for the attack on mandatory
student fees being used to subsidize campus political activity that
the individual student might find objectionable. The Court had
previously held that public sector employees could not be required
to pay for the political activities of the unions that bargained for
them, 170 and that lawyers in states with integrated bars to which all
lawyers had to belong could not be made to pay for the political
and lobbying activities of the state bar associations.'
The
conservative groups tried to apply the same principle to student
activities fees. 1 72 The result
was a unanimous ruling against them,
73
and the fees were upheld. 1
The Court stated that it was aware that there was a First
Amendment problem in extracting money from people to support
groups and ideas with which they disagree. 174 The Court has long
recognized that the right to speak and associate requires the
negative cognate right to refuse to speak or to refuse to
associate. 175 The Court said that the problem with applying that
169

See generally id. at 1356. There are three main cases the Court relies on in

analyzing Board of Regents. They are Abood v. Detroit Bd. Of Ed., 431 U.S.
209 (1977); Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1 (1990); and
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995)
(holding that the principal protection of the First Amendment interests of
objecting students is the requirement of viewpoint neutrality in the allocation of
funding support.) Id.
170 Abood, 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (holding that union and nonunion members
could prevent the Union from spending a part of their required service fees to
contribute to political candidates and to express political views unrelated to its
duties as the exclusive bargaining representative).
171 Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1990) (holding that
lawyers admitted to practice in California could be required to join a state bar
association but to only fund activities "germane" to the association's mission of
"regulating the legal profession and improving the quality of legal services").
172 Board of Regents, 120 S. Ct. at 1352.
173 Id. at 1354.
174 Id.

Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (holding that the freedom of
thought protected by the First Amendment includes both the right to speak freely
and the right to refrain from speaking at all). In Wooley, a New Hampshire man
covered over the state motto, "Live Free or Die," on his license plate and was
175
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right in a university setting was an extremely practical one. It is
one thing to decide what a germane activity is when it comes to
unions and bar associations, such as supporting collective
bargaining or professional regulation, and what is not a germane
activity, such as supporting political action committees or
candidates. 176 But, in a university setting how could it be decided
what is a germane student activity, and what is a non-germane
activity? How cart the university allow you to refuse to pay the
portion of your student fee that went to "non-germane" activities?
In fact, the Court said, that inquiry itself would pose academic
freedom problems, and the courts would be second guessing which
177
student groups the university should use fees to subsidize.
Rather than getting into this quagmire, the Court said it was
comfortable with only the First Amendment safety net supplied by
the rule against view point discrimination. Student fees can be
used for a wide variety of purposes without a First Amendment
challenge unless it can be shown that they are administered in178
a
view.
of
points
certain
against
way to promote discrimination
As long as the money is available to all groups without regard to
race, color or creed or political view point, the Court stated that it
would pose too great a First Amendment problem to routinely
intervene. 179 Therefore, if you pay your student activity fee, the
university may subsidize ideas and groups you may not like
so
80
like.'
do
you
groups
against
discrimination
no
is
long as there
charged with a misdemeanor pursuant to a New Hampshire statute. Id. After
being convicted several times pursuant to the New Hampshire statute, Wooley, a
Jehovah's Witness, sought federal injunctive and declaratory relief. Id. The
Supreme Court held the New Hampshire statute violative of the First
Amendment and reasoned that there was a negative cognate right not to speak
inherent in the First Amendment right to free speech. Id. at 715; See also, West

Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). The most famous
quote that comes from West Virginia is from Justice Jackson when he stated: "If
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official,
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,

religion, or other matter of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act
their faith therein." Id. at 642.
176 Board of Regents, 120 S. Ct. at 1355.
177 Id.
178

Id. at 1355-56.

Id. at 1356-57.
0Id. at 1357. This concept is discussed in Part III of the Court's decision.
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The final two First Amendment cases of the Term were
really two variations on one theme, namely, whether the First
Amendment right of association for expressive purposes is violated
when government forces political or social groups to include
members whose presence will change the nature of the group's
message. In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual
Group of Boston, l18 the Court ruled that it violated a parade
group's right of expression and association for government to
compel the parade organizers to include a gay contingent in the
parade. This would alter and change the message the parade
organizers are seeking to express. This Term the Court applied
similar principles to protect the freedom of association rights of
both the Democratic Party and the Boy Scouts.
The first of the two cases is CaliforniaDemocraticParty v.
82
Jones.1 It involved California's enactment of a so-called blanket
primary. 183 During the primary elections, there is one ballot that is
a blanket ballot for all parties and candidates. Everyone who is
running is on that ballot, and every voter, no matter what party or
non-party he or she is a member of, can vote to nominate any
candidate to be any party's standard bearer. 184 That means that a
lot of people who are not Republicans or Democrats can choose
the nominee of the Democratic Party or the Republican Party or
the Peace and Freedom Party. The Democratic Party argued that it
is their job and right to choose their party's nominees, and it is not
the prerogative of members of other parties. Moreover, this
requirement was enacted with the purpose of making the parties
less partisan and more congenial to cooperation.1 85
The
government's theory was that when you are nominating a person
who has to appeal to all voters, you are going to nominate more
moderate and "centrist" people.186 The Court rejected this theory
515 U.S. 557 (1995).
120 S. Ct. 2402.
183 Id. at 2405.
1984
See CAL. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 2001 (West Supp. 2000). This section reads in
18

182Jones,

pertinent part that: "[a]ll persons entitled to vote, including those not affiliated
with any political party, shall have the right to vote... for any candidate
regardless of the candidate's political affiliation." Id.
18 Jones, 120 S. Ct at 2411.
116 Id. at 2411-13.
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in a seven to two decision. 187 This was a clear effort on the part of
the state to dictate both the message and the messengers that the
particular parties should choose. 188 That violates the party's right
of expressive association, the party's right to decide what its
message will be and who its messengers will be. The fact that the
state did not like more partisan politics is an overt content-based
action that could not survive the strict scrutiny that such contentbased laws require.
Justice Scalia wrote the opinion and said that there is no
89
compelling interest in trying to make the parties less partisan.'
Parties are supposed to be partisan so they can get their messages
out, and the competition in ideas will help the voters better decide.
The state cannot interfere with partisanship by requiring that nonparty members be part of the process of selecting party
nominees. 190 In the seven to two decision, the right to expressive
association prevails, and the right of parties to choose their "own"
nominees is given very strong First Amendment protection.191
The final case is Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.192 This
was a very close five to four decision. 193 The case was a stark
conservative-liberal split. 194 The issue dealt with New Jersey's
See Jones, 120 S. Ct. 2402. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court
and Chief Justice Rebnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas,
and Breyer joined him. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, in which
Justice Ginsburg joined as to Part I. Id.
188 Id. at 2412.
189 Id. (citing Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of
187

Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 578 (1995).
190 Id.
191 Id. at 2409-10. It is interesting to note that the blanket primary decision and
the campaign finance case are on a collision course. The campaign finance case
recognizes broader government control over campaigns and elections, while the
blanket primary case looks toward lesser government controls over campaigns
and party politics. Id. at 2415 (Kennedy, J., concurring.) The clash of
perspectives may very well be resolved in the Colorado Republican case
currently pending, which deals with the right of parties to spend funds to support
their candidates.
192 Boy Scouts ofAmerica, 120 S. Ct 2446.
193 Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined. Justice Stevens filed a
dissenting opinion, in which Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined. Id.
194 Id. This split has been seen most often, and obviously, in the federalism
cases, whereby the conservative majority, has cut back on Congress' power to
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public accommodation law. 195 The New Jersey courts determined
that the Boy Scouts was "a place of public accommodation"
subject to the public accommodation law. 196 The law barred
exclusion of97anyone on a number of grounds, including sexual
orientation.'
Mr. Dale was an assistant scoutmaster and a college
student, when it became apparent through his college political
activities that he was a member of a gay rights group.' 8 The Boy
Scouts excluded him from that position due to his sexual
orientation.199 The New Jersey courts held that because the Boy
Scouts was a place of public accommodation, and since there was
no clear message against homosexual conduct or activity expressed
by the organization, the Boy Scouts would be required to include
Mr. Dale as a scoutmaster. 200 The court also held that it was not a
violation of the Boy Scouts' First Amendment rights to require Mr.
legislate on many issues and returned that power to the States. See, e.g., United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Chief Justice Rehnquist is the leader of
the conservative faction that includes Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and
Thomas. The liberals are headed by Justice Stevens and followed, by rank of
seniority, by Justices Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer. Id. That schism was also
painfully apparent in the Court's five to four decision in Bush v. Gore, 121 S.
Ct. 525 (2000) (per curiam).
195 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-4 and 10:5-5 (West Supp. 2000). The Supreme

Court reprinted the New Jersey Public Accommodation Law as an appendix to
the opinion in Boy Scouts ofAmerica, 120 S.Ct. at 2458-59.
196 Boy Scouts of America, 120 S. Ct at 2450. The New Jersey
Superior Court's
Chancery Division granted summary judgment in favor of the Boy Scouts
holding that "New Jersey's public accommodation law was inapplicable because
the Boy Scouts was not a place of public accommodation." However, the New
Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, and the Supreme Court, held that the
"Boy Scouts was a place of public accommodation subject to the public
accommodations law, that the organization was not exempt ....and that the
Boy Scouts violated the law by revoking Dale's membership based on his
avowed homosexuality." Id.
197 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West Supp. 2000). This section reads
in pertinent
part that: "[a]ll persons shall have the opportunity to obtain ...privileges of any
place of public accommodation ...without discrimination because of... sexual
orientation." Id.
198 Boy Scouts ofAmerica, 120 S.Ct. at 2449.
199 Id. Upon discovery of Dale's sexual orientation, James Kay, an Executive
from the Monmouth County New Jersey Council of Boy Scouts wrote to Dale
revoking his adult membership in the organization.
200 Id. at 2450.

2000

FREEDOM OF SPEECH

233

Dale to be a scoutmaster. 20 1 The United States Supreme Court
reversed, in a close five to four ruling.
The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, said
that the Boy Scouts, as an organization, has a right to expressive
association, and may associate together to express various points of
view. 202 One of their views is that the Boy Scouts have to pledge
that they are morally straight and clean. 203 The Boy Scouts
interpret the pledge to exclude homosexual conduct. 20 4 Therefore,
requiring the Scouts to retain in a visible leadership position a
person who symbolically expresses a contrary viewpoint, is an
improper and burdensome imposition on the group's First
Amendment expressive associational rights.
The dissenters in the Supreme Court said this was not the
Boy Scouts message and that the Boy Scouts do not believe
homosexual conduct is wrong. 20 5 Therefore, it is not an imposition
on the Scouts' ideology to require that they accept a person in an
201 Id. More specifically, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that Dale's
membership does not violate the Boy Scouts' right of "'expression because his
inclusion would not affect in any significant way [the Boy Scouts'] existing
members' ability to carry out their various purposes."' Id. (quoting Dale v. Boy
Scouts of America, 16C0 N.J. 562, 615, 734 A.2d 1196, 1225 (1999) (citation

omitted)).
202 Id. at 2452 (citing Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984)).
"Even the training of outdoor survival skills or participation in community
service might become expressive when the activity is intended to develop good
morals, reverence, patriotism, and a desire for self-improvement." Roberts, 468
U.S. at 636 (O'Connor, .., concurring).
203 Boy Scouts ofAmerica, 120 S.Ct. at 2452. The Boy Scout Handbook defines
morally straight as:
To be a person of strong character, guide your life with honesty, purity, and
justice. Respect and defend the rights of all people. Your relationships with
others should be honest and open. Be clean in your speech and actions, and
faithful in your religious beliefs. The values you follow as a Scout will help you
become virtuous and self-reliant.
Id. at 2461. The Boy Scout Handbook states the following about a Scout being
clean: "A Scout is CLEAN. A Scout keeps his body and mindfit and clean. He
chooses the company of those who live by these same ideals. He helps keep his
home and community clean." Id. (emphasis in original).
204 Boy Scouts of America, 120 S.Ct at 2453.

Id. at 2461-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissenters went through an
analysis of the Boy Scout Handbook and the Scoutmaster Handbook to arrive at
the conclusion that nothing written in either book "expresses any position
whatsoever on sexual matters." Id. at 2461.
205
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20 6
official position who is involved in homosexual activities.
However, the majority disagreed, stating it was up to the
association, not the courts, to say what its views, doctrines and
tenets were.2 °7
The government cannot wield public
accommodation laws in this fashion. The Court found that
homosexuality was not consistent with the message that the Boy
Scouts were trying to get across. Whether the Court agreed or
disagreed was irrelevant because it was the Boy Scouts' position
and it was part of their creed, and to say otherwise would minimize
their right of expression.208 The Boy Scouts are permitted to have
an official position or viewpoint, and when a person expresses the
opposite because of his or her status or activity, he causes a
significant burden on the Boy Scouts. 20 9 The majority concluded
that the Boy Scouts had a First Amendment right of expressive
association to exclude openly gay or homosexual people from
official positions.210
The case did not involve excluding Boy Scouts because
they were gay. 211 The case involved excluding people from
official positions, such as assistant scoutmasters. 2 2 However, a
case about excluding mere members might be more difficult for the

206 Id. at 2467 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
207

208

Id. at 2454-56.
Id. at 2453. The Court stated that they accepted the Boy Scouts' assertion as

to its policy on homosexuality. Id. The Court noted that because the Boy
Scouts viewpoint on homosexuality was contained in the written record, there
was no need to inquire into the nature of the expression. It satisfied the Court
that, contained within the written record, the Boy Scouts view was stated as
such: "We believe that homosexual conduct is inconsistent with the requirement
in the Scout Oath that a Scout be morally straight and in the Scout Law that a
Scout be cledn in word and deed, and that homosexuals do not provide a
desirable role model for Scouts." Id.
209 Id. at 2455. The Court stated that "[t]he presence of an avowed homosexual
and gay rights activist in an assistant scoutmaster's uniform sends a distinctly
different message from the presence of a heterosexual assistant scoutmaster who
is on record as disagreeing with Boy Scouts policy." Id. The Court noted that
the Boy Scouts did have a First Amendment right to portray one message and
withhold another, and the distinction noted above was the Court's major premise
for
2 0 this reasoning. Id.
" Boy Scouts ofAmerica, 120 S. Ct. at 2455.
2n id. at 2453.
212 id.
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213
Court. Justices Stevens and Souter wrote very strong dissents.
They said that homosexuality is not inconsistent with the Boy
Scouts' message. 2 14 They felt that even though scouts were
required to have a morally straight and clean status, a homosexual
person did not interfere with that requirement. 215 Therefore the
Scouts' expressive association claim should have been rejected.216
In the future, the issue of membership exclusion based on
homosexual status might be a more difficult issue for the Court
because excluding a mere member would not seem to be as much
of an embodiment of the Boy Scouts' philosophy, message or
tenet.
In the news recently there have been reports that various
school boards have entertained resolutions to deny school facilities
to certain boy scout groups because the boards felt their policies,
which were protected by the Court in Boy Scouts of America v.
Dale, were still wrong and discriminatory. 2 17 I think that is
something you would have to pursue with caution. If you are
talking about public school facilities that are made generally
available to all groups, then it is a public forum situation. For
example, if you exclude some groups because you do not agree
with their messages or policies, you would be going up against the
rules of the public; forum. Moreover, a federal statute requires
equal access to school facilities for a wide variety of student
groups.211 Some light may be shed on such issues in a pending
case dealing with access by a religious student group to public
school facilities.219
213 See Boy Scouts of A'merica, 120 S. Ct. 2446. Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer joined Justice Steven's dissenting opinion, and Justices Ginsburg and
Breyer
joined in on Justice Souter's dissent.
214 Id. atalso
2465, (Stevens, J., dissenting).
215 Id. at 2470.
216 Id. at 2478.

217Anemona Hartocollis, Lovy Limits Scout Events in the Schools, THE NEW
YORK TIMES, December 2, 2000, B 1.
218 Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C.A. Section 4071 (1984).
219 The Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 202 F.3d 502 (2d Cir. 2000)

cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 296 (2000). This case involves a nondenominational
children's club that was denied access to use the Milford Central School. The
United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, granted
summary judgment for the school and a divided (2-1) Second Circuit panel
affirmed, stating that ihe school policywas reasonable, and that because the
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CONCLUSION
The Court's First Amendment Term this year seems
relatively quiet and tranquil, as compared to last Term's. But who
knows what storms are brewing just beyond the horizon.

club's message was religious' in nature, excluding the club was not
impermissibly based on viewpoint and not violative of the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on October 10, 2000. Id.

